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JURISDICTION
This case involves a second degree felony and a writ for
extraordinary relief; therefore, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e)7

(f) .

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether

the

lower

court

erred

in

dismissing

the

Petition as frivolous, when the trial court failed to comply with the
majority of the requirements in Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The standard of review, since the matter presents questions
of

law, is that no deference

conclusions.

is accorded

to the trial court's

The conclusions are reviewed for correctness.

Stewart

v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Casida v. Deland,
866 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Yates, 918 P. 2d 136,
138 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . See also, State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (appellate courts review conclusions of law under
non-deferential correctness of error standard when the facts are
undisputed.)
II.

The facts should not be in dispute in this case.
Whether the lower court misinterpreted the case law in

ruling that the Petition was barred for failure to file a direct
appeal.
The same standard

of review applies:

The errors

are

questions of law which are reviewed by the Court for correctness,
requiring no deference to the lower court's conclusions.
Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992).

1

Gerrish v.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Statutes, rules and cases which are determinative of the
respective issues include the following: Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure (formerly Rule 11(5) ; Rule 65B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-13-6, 76-6-4 04; and the
United States Supreme Court decisions in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243-44 (1969); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the July 14, 1997, ruling by Judge Jon
M. Memmott of the Second District Court, denying Appellant's pro se
Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Vacate Conviction. The Court
ruled that the Petition was frivolous on its face and dismissed said
Petition pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(5).
The Petition, which was filed pro se by Mark Anthony Duran,
aka Mark Anthony Bresqko (hereinafter "Duran" or "Appellant"), raises
numerous constitutional infirmities in his guilty plea of July 27,
1982, to the second degree felony charge of theft, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404.

Appellant entered a guilty plea pursuant to an oral plea

agreement, in which a third degree felony count was dismissed.
The transcript shows the guilty plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered. The Court did not comply with Rule 11(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court failed to establish
a factual basis for the crime, that Appellant obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over another's vehicle with the intent to
2

permanently deprive the owner of said property.

The Court did not

explain the nature and elements of the crime to Appellant.

No

statement in advance of plea or plea affidavit was used to explain the
elements of the crime or the constitutional rights to Appellant.
The Court failed to ascertain and obtain from the Appellant
a waiver of his constitutional rights pertaining to: his presumption
of innocence, the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury,
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in open court, and
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses.

The Court

did not inform Appellant of the minimum and maximum sentence for such
a felony.
The Court

failed to advise Appellant

of any right

to

withdraw his guilty plea, or the time frame in which to withdraw such
a plea.
Duran claims the trial court erred in failing to comply with
Rule 11 and by not ensuring that the guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered.
frivolous

The lower court's denial of said Petition as

is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.

In the

alternative, this Court should remand the case for further proceedings
in the Second District Court.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Duran was charged in the Second District Court with second
and third degree felonies. On July 27, 1982, he entered a guilty plea
to theft of a motor vehicle, a second degree felony.

Despite a Rule

402 Motion to reduce the charge to a third degree felony, Duran was
3

sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. Duran has
served and completed that sentence. However, Duran is still suffering
the consequences of said conviction inasmuch as he is incarcerated in
the Limon Correctional Facility in the State of Colorado.

Based in

part upon the second degree felony conviction from the Second District
Court, Duran has been sentenced to a life sentence as an habitual
criminal in the State of Colorado with a parole eligibility date only
after serving 40 years.

Without the conviction from the Second

District Court, Duran would not be subjected to punishment as a
habitual criminal.
Duran did not file a direct appeal of the 1982 judgment and
conviction.
FINAL DISPOSITION
On or about October 4, 1994, a Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief to Vacate Judgment was filed. The court's final ruling denying
said Petition was entered on or about July 14, 1997. Duran filed a
timely appeal thereof.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Appellant was charged in the Second District Court with
theft of a motor vehicle, a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 76-4-412(1) (a) (ii) . Appellant entered a guilty plea
on July 27, 1982, pursuant to an oral plea agreement in which another
felony count was dismissed.

(See transcript, attached hereto as

Addendum (hereinafter "Add." at 24-32.) The trial court refers to the
charge as "theft," and not theft of a motor vehicle.
4

2.

No statement in advance of plea or plea affidavit was

used to explain the elements of the crime or the constitutional rights
to Appellant.
3.

Add. at 25-31.
The transcript shows the guilty plea was not knowingly

and voluntarily entered. The court did not comply with Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4.

Add. at 25-31.

The trial court failed to establish a factual basis for

the theft, that Appellant obtained or exercised unauthorized control
over another's vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the
owner of said property.

The court did not explain the nature and

elements of the crime to Appellant.
5.

Add. at 25-31.

The court failed to ascertain and obtain from the

Appellant a waiver of his constitutional rights pertaining to:

the

right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses in open court, and the right to
compel the attendance of defense witnesses.
6.

The court did not inform Appellant of the minimum and

maximum sentence for such a felony.
7.

Add. at 25-31.

Add. at 25-31.

The court failed to advise Appellant of any right to

withdraw his guilty plea, or the time frame in which to withdraw such
a plea.

Add. at 25-31.
8.

Plaintiff's Petition for Post Conviction Relief to

Vacate Conviction was denied by the Court on July 14, 1997.

Pursuant

to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(b) (7) , said Petition was dismissed
as frivolous on its face.

Add. at 33-36.

appealed said dismissal.
5

Appellant then timely

9.

Appellant is incarcerated in the Limon Correctional

Facility in Colorado on a life sentence as an habitual criminal. He
must serve 4 0 years before being eligible for parole.

If the

conviction from the Second District Court is set aside, Appellant will
not be subject to the 40-year commitment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

lower

court

committed

plain

error

in dismissing

Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to Vacate Conviction
as frivolous. This Court should reverse the lower court's dismissal
on the basis of manifest error.
The trial court's total disregard for Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting the guilty plea requires
reversal.

The transcript of said plea colloquy shows that the plea

was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that the basic due
process requirements of Rule 11 were ignored.

The court failed to

explain the elements of the second degree felony charge of theft to
Duran.

There was no factual basis for said plea.

Duran was never

informed of his right to withdraw the guilty plea.

The court never

informed Duran of the minimum and maximum sentence for such a felony.
The lower court, in dismissing the Petition as frivolous,
did not deal with the significant constitutional violations of Duran's
rights during the change of plea hearing.

Instead, the court

mistakenly found that by entering his guilty plea, Duran had admitted
all

essential

elements

jurisdictional effects.

of

the

crime

and

waived

all

normal

See Ruling, Add. at 34. The court further
6

found that the Petition could not be granted because Duran failed to
file a direct appeal.
The

court's

Add. at 34.
findings

are

not

consistent

with

the

overwhelming case law that such obvious unconstitutional convictions
can be addressed through collateral attacks at any time.
ARGUMENT
I.
The
Trial
Court
Clearly
Violated
Appellants
Constitutional Rights By Failing To Comply With Rule 11(e) Of The Utah
Rules Of Criminal Procedure When Accepting His Guilty Plea.
The facts in this case are undisputed.

All of the pertinent

facts are contained in the transcript of the July 27, 1982 change of
plea hearing.

See Add. at 24-32.

At the time the Second Judicial

District Court accepted Appellant's guilty plea to the second degree
felony of theft of a motor vehicle, it did not establish that said
guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.

The record shows

Appellant's due process rights were violated at said hearing.
Appellant's constitutional rights were violated when the
trial

court

failed

to

comply with

Rule

11 of

the Utah Rules

Criminal Procedure, which states:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the
plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by
counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to
counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses,
the right to compel the attendance of
defense
witnesses and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived;

7

of

(4) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered,
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed
for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what
agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right
of appeal is limited.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest
or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the
plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), (f).
The transcript shows obvious violations of
(2),

(3), (4), (5), and

(7) of Rule 11(e).

subparagraphs

The major

violations

included not establishing the plea was voluntary, not explaining the
nature and elements of offense to Duran, not explaining minimum and
maximum sentences, including the possibility of consecutive sentences,
not advising Duran of his right to file a motion to withdraw his plea,
and not explaining the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Various cases support Appellant's position that such total
failure to comply with Rule 11 renders the guilty plea fatally flawed.
See, State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443
Gibbons, 740 P.2d

1309

(Utah 1983); State v.

(Utah 1987); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119,

1123-24 (Utah 1991); Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44

(1969);

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); McCarthy v. United States,

8

394 U.S. 459

(1969) .

When the guilty plea has been accepted in

violation of Rule 11, the case should be remanded
defendant a chance to plea anew.

to give the

McCarthy, 3 94 U.S. at 492.

Duran's limited plea colloquy clearly establishes that the
court failed to comply with Rule 11(e) . Although the current standard
requiring strict adherence to Rule 11(e) was not established until
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the trial court's inquiry
fails miserably under any test, particularly the "record as a whole"
test.

State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,

denied, 765 P. 2d 1278
showing

that

the

(Utah 1988) .

court

had

The test in 1982 required a

substantially

constitutional and procedural requirements.

complied

with

the

State v. Stilling, 856

P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
A.

The Plea Was Not Knowingly And Voluntarily Entered.
"A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made in

order

to protect

a defendant's

due process

rights."

State v.

Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v.
Gibbons,

740

P.2d

1309,

1312

(Utah

1987)).

When

the

court

significantly departs from constitutional and procedural requirements
it creates doubt as to the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty
plea.

Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671. The determination of whether there

has been substantial compliance with these requirements turns on the
facts of the individual case.

Id.

Courts have typically looked at the affidavit which is
signed during the change of plea hearing and the plea colloquy to
determine

if the defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily
9

entered.

"The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency,

but an affidavit should be only the starting point, not an end point,
in the pleading process." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313.
The trial court may not rely on either defense counsel or
affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 11(e). State
v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94.

"Rather, with or without an

affidavit or defense counsel's advice, the trial court must conduct
an

on-the-record

requirements."

review

with

defendant

of

the

Rule

11 (e)

Id.

No affidavit or statement in advance of plea was used during
Duran's July 27, 1982, hearing.

Although the lack of an affidavit

does not render the plea involuntary, it does force the court to
review all of defendant's constitutional rights during the plea
colloquy.

In this case, the trial court failed to explain the

consequences of his plea, did not ascertain whether Duran understood
the nature and elements of the theft charge, did not determine whether
there was a factual basis for the plea, failed to explain the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to compel the attendance
of defense witnesses, and did not explain the right to withdraw the
guilty plea.

See Rule ll(e); Add. at 25-31.

The plea colloquy clearly was "materially and fatally
defective" in a number of ways.
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) .

State v. Morello, 927 P.2d 646, 648

The information provided to Duran at said

hearing is a stark contrast to the plea colloquy in State v. Parsons,
781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989), in which the court stated, "It is

10

clear from the record that great care was taken to ascertain the
voluntariness of his plea."
Appellant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered
when there was no written affidavit or statement in advance of plea
and

the

only

information

provided

to

Appellant

regarding

his

constitutional rights was the brief plea colloquy with the court,
which ignored the basic due process requirements of Rule 11.
"It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the
trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary."

Boykin v. Alabama,

394 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1969).
B. The Trial Court Did Not Explain The Nature, Elements of The Crime.
The plea colloquy shows that the trial court did not comply
with Rule 11(e) (4) , which requires a finding that Duran understood the
nature and elements of the offense.
The type of brief, conclusory inquiry posed by Duran7 s trial
judge has been frowned upon by the courts.
IIS

P.2d

1332,

1335

(Utah

Ct.

App.

See, State v. Valencia,

1989).

The

defendant's

"understanding of the elements of the charges and the relationship of
the law and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or incomplete
examination."

Id. at 1335.

A guilty plea cannot be "knowing" when defendant does not
"understand the elements of the crimes charged and the relationship
of the law to the facts."

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312.

[T] he factual elements of the charges against the defendant
must be explained in the taking of a guilty plea so that
the defendant understands and admits those elements:
11

[B] ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all of the
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly
voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding
of the law in relation to the facts...
The judge must determine "that the conduct which the
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the
indictment or information or an offense included therein to
which the defendant has pleaded guilty...."
Id. at 1313.
The court did not explain to Duran the elements of the
felony theft charge.

To be found guilty of theft, the elements

require that the defendant exercise or obtain unauthorized control
over the property of another with the purpose of permanently depriving
him of said property.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-401(3), 404.

Further,

the court did not establish a factual basis for the alleged motor
vehicle theft.

The court's attempt to explain the elements and

establish a factual basis was limited to the following:
THE COURT: What was your involvement in this and just the part
of Count Two?
MR. DURAN: Just riding out to Bountiful. That's it.
THE COURT: Oh, what was taken?
MR. DURAN: From the car?
THE COURT: Well, I don't know. Theft, a felony of the second
degree, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control-The car?
MR. DURAN
It's a car?
THE COURT
Right
MR. DURAN
You were with somebody else, is that it?
THE COURT
Yes, sir.
MR. DURAN
Both of you did it together; is that correct?
THE COURT
Yes, sir.
MR. DURAN
Where were you going to go with the car?
THE COURT
Out to Bountiful.
MR. DURAN
Where did you take the car, from what city?
THE COURT
Salt Lake.
MR. DURAN
Transcript of July 27, 1982, hearing; Add. at 29-30.
The decision in State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah
1983) , supports Duran's position that the above-quoted element/factual
12

colloquy was constitutionally lacking.

After analyzing the plea

colloquy, the court in Breckenridge concluded that the defendant did
not understand the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled
guilty.

The court stated that the transcript recited "no factual

basis from which we might conclude that an arson ever occurred." Id.
at 443.

The court stated that the essential element of arson, that

a person intentionally damaged property, had not been shown.

Id.

In the instant case, the transcript shows that the court
never outlined the elements of theft of a motor vehicle and never
established by Duran's admissions or otherwise that he exercised
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle with the purpose of
permanently depriving the owner of said vehicle. Duran's statements
to the court, that he was "just riding out to Bountiful," that he did
"it" with "somebody else," and that they travelled from Salt Lake to
Bountiful, fail to establish the crucial element of Duran's intent to
permanently deprive the owner of said vehicle.

Add. at 29-30.

Intent is such a crucial element that failure to address it
requires reversal.

In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), a

plea to second degree murder was deemed involuntary where the
defendant was not informed that the intent to cause the victim' s death
was an element of the crime.
Duran's admissions, which more closely describe the offense
of joy riding, fail to establish the required factual basis for the
alleged theft.

In fact, it would appear from the court's colloquy

that it was not even aware that the theft involved a vehicle. At one
point, the court asked, "What was taken?" Duran responded, "From the
13

car?" The trial court then responded, "Well, I don't know," and then
made a brief and ineffective attempt to describe the theft. Add. at
29-30.

Since the court obviously was confused about the charges, it

is logical to conclude that Duran did not understand the nature and
elements of the offense.
Appellant did not have the luxury of a written affidavit or
statement in advance of plea. The only information he had pertaining
to his constitutional rights was what the court provided to him during
the plea colloquy.

Therefore, even when this Court considers the

"record as a whole, " it is obvious the record

fails to pass

constitutional muster. The record seemingly mandates a reversal for
a blatant violation of Appellant's rights.
842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992).

See, Willett v. Barnes,

The court's failure to comply with

Rule 11 and satisfy itself there was a factual basis for the
defendant's plea is not deemed harmless error. See, United States v.
Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1988).
The judge must determine "that the conduct which the
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the
indictment or information or an offense included therein to
which the defendant has pleaded guilty." Requiring this
examination of the relation between the law and the acts
the defendant admits having committed is designed to
"protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not
actually fall within the charge."
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969).
C.

The Record Does Not Establish A Factual Basis For The Plea.
The court cannot be satisfied that a guilty plea is knowing

and voluntary unless the record establishes facts that would place the
defendant at risk of conviction should the matter proceed to trial.
14

Willett, 842 P.2d at 862. This requirement "has been described as the
need for a factual basis for the plea."

State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d

666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In Willett, the defendant filed a writ
of habeas corpus to set aside his guilty plea to first degree murder.
The court held that the trial court failed to establish a factual
basis for the guilty plea.

The following plea colloquy was found to

be insufficient to establish said factual basis:
MR. WATSON:
Perhaps the court would want to inquire
whether or not there is a factual basis from this
particular defendant with regard to the entry of this plea
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Suppose you state for the court briefly Mr.
Willett how exactly it happened on the 20th of November?
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: Well, I aided and abetted my father.
THE COURT: In doing what?
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: In the commission of killing Mr. Dan
Okleberry.
THE COURT: I suppose that is adequate Mr. Watson.
Willett, 842 P.2d at 861-62.
When this Court compares the plea colloquy in Willett with
the trial court's colloquy with Duran, it is clear that Duran's rights
also were seriously violated.

There is no way that Duran's guilty

plea was entered based upon a sufficient factual basis.
D.

One Of The Most Glaring Errors Was The Court's Failure To
Inform Duran Of The Consequences Of His Plea.
One of the most glaring errors committed by the trial court

was its total disregard for Rule 11(e) (5) , which states that the court
must find that the "defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence
including

the possibility

of

the

imposition

of

consecutive

sentences."
The record of the plea colloquy is conspicuously absent in
any reference to a minimum or maximum sentence which could be imposed
15

upon Duran for the second degree felony.

The court never mentions

that Duran could be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate sentence of 1 to 15 years for a second degree felony.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant
must be "fully aware of the direct consequences" of the plea.

See.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) .
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements
are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis
for that duty is found in Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-12, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969),
where the United States Supreme Court stated: "What is at
stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence."
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d, 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987).
The trial court neglected to inform Duran of the full
consequences of his plea, "namely, the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences."

State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94

(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).

The court

was fully informed that Appellant was being sentenced on unrelated
charges on August 18, 1982, just one week prior to the August 24,
1982, sentencing on the motor vehicle theft.

Add. at 31.

The plea

colloquy lacks any reference to the possibility of Duran's sentence
running concurrently or consecutively with any other charges.
E.

The Trial Court Never Informed Duran Of His Right To Withdraw
The Guilty Plea.
Rule 11(e) (7) requires the court to advise defendant of the

time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea.
16

A review of

the transcript shows the trial court made no reference to Duran having
any right to withdraw his guilty plea.

Add. at 25-31.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 governs the withdrawal of guilty
pleas. At the time Duran entered his plea in 1982, § 77-13-6(2) read:
"A plea

of

not

guilty may

be withdrawn

at

any

time prior

to

conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of court."

§ 77-13-6(2) (1980) ; State

v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) . The statute was amended in
1989 to add the requirement that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
must be made within 3 0 days after entry of said plea.

Abeyta, 852 at

995.
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987), the
court noted that the statutory provision governing the withdrawal of
the guilty plea sets no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw
said plea.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1980) .

Under the statute in place in 1982, Duran simply must show
"good cause" to withdraw his guilty plea. The numerous constitutional
infirmities outlined throughout this Brief clearly establish good
cause.
The court's failure to advise Duran of the time limits for
filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea is not grounds to set the
plea aside, but "may be the ground for extending the time to make a
motion under Section 77-13-6."

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f).

Therefore,

although the pro se Petition may not have specifically requested to
withdraw the guilty plea, Duran requests that if this case is remanded
to the Second District Court that he be permitted to file a formal
17

motion to withdraw his guilty plea at that time.

It is an abuse of

discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the
defendant did not have full knowledge and understanding of the
consequences of his plea.

State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 95.

There is no question that Duran's constitutional rights were
violated at the time the trial court accepted his guilty plea.

Any

of the enumerated errors listed above are sufficient grounds to grant
said Petition.

The court did not take the required steps to ensure

that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that Duran
had consciously waived his numerous constitutional rights.

II. The Lower Court Misinterpreted The Case Law In Ruling
That The Petition Was Barred For Failure To File A Direct Appeal.
In dismissing the Petition as frivolous, the lower court
cited two cases which stand for the proposition that this Petition
could not be granted because Duran had not exercised his rights in
filing a direct appeal.

See Ruling, Add. at 34.

However, one of the cases cited by the court, Parsons v.
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994), supports Duran's position that
his

Petition

is a proper

means

infirmities of his guilty plea.
defendant has suffered

to

attack

the

constitutional

"Habeas relief is available where a

'obvious injustice' or

prejudicial denial of a constitutional right.'"

'substantial and
Id. at 519.

The

court stated that normally such petitions are no substitute for
appellate review and such issues should be raised on direct appeal.
"However, where 'unusual circumstances are present to justify the
failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, a court may entertain
18

such a claim raised for the first time in the habeas corpus
petition.'"
unusual

Id.

The court in Parsons, even without a showing of

circumstances, went on to consider the merits of the

constitutional arguments. Id.
Duran has met the "unusual circumstances" test.

The plea

colloquy ignored the Rule 11(e) requirements to such an extent that
the injustice is obvious.

The failure to inform Duran of his right

to withdraw the guilty plea, the minimum and maximum sentence,
including consecutive sentences, and the nature and elements of the
felony, are such substantial and prejudicial constitutional violations
that they satisfy the exception to the general rule.
Duran's argument that his Petition is not only timely but
raises significant constitutional issues is enhanced by the fact that
the trial court never informed him of his right to withdraw a guilty
plea or to file any appeal related thereto. See hearing transcript,
Add. at 24-32.
Since Duran had not been represented by counsel until the
filing of this appeal, he should not be held to the same stringent
pleading standards as if he had been represented by counsel. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) .

Duran apparently did not file a

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but if this Court remands the case
for further proceedings in the Second District Court, he should be
permitted to file a motion at that time.
Since Duran is facing 4 0 years as an habitual criminal in
the State of Colorado, based upon the enhancements which include the
prior 1982 conviction from the Second District Court, the argument
19

that this Court should consider the constitutional validity of such
a prior conviction is even stronger.

For example, under the Armed

Career Criminal Act (hereinafter "ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a
defendant who is convicted of being a felon in possession of a fire
arm receives an enhanced sentence of at least 15 years if he has three
prior convictions for a serious drug offense or a violent felony.
Courts must consider constitutional challenges to the validity of
prior convictions under the ACCA.

The present

use of a prior

conviction in a sense renews the constitutional violation and requires
that present constitutional standards be applied.

United States v.

Burt, 802 F.2d 330, 335-36 (9th Cir. 1986); see also, Hart v. Risley,
585 F.Supp. 269, 273 (D. Mont. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.
1985), cert, denied, (1985); State v. Holsworth, 607 P.2d 845, 848-49
(Wash. 1980).
The case law under the ACCA clearly permits constitutional
challenges

to

the validity

of

prior

convictions.

These

cases

strengthen Duran's position that the lower court's cursory dismissal
of his Petition without addressing the merits of the significant
constitutional errors was totally inappropriate.
The availability of the transcript of the plea colloquy from
1982 provides further evidence that Duran's Petition should not be
summarily dismissed.

In State v. Morello, 927 P.2d 646 (Utah Ct. App.

1996), the court upheld the dismissal of a motion to withdraw guilty
plea which was brought 12 years after the conviction.

However, a

crucial factor in the court's decision was that the transcript no
longer was available.

Id. at 648.
20

Duran has provided a full

transcript for the Court's review, and there is no reason not to
address the Petition on its merits.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the
lower court and grant the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to
Vacate Conviction. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the
lower court's Ruling and remand for further proceedings in the Second
District Court.

If necessary, Duran should be permitted to file a

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
DATED this 12th day of November, 1997.

David W. Brown
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were hand delivered on this 12th day of
November, 1997, to the following:
Christine Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 3967
F.EP.ORTER.'A.TRANSCF. I FT

vs .
MARK ANTHONY DURAN,

OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant.
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Tuesday, July 27, 1982,
the above-entitled matter came on for PRE-TRIAL in the
Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County,
State of Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNASY,

Presiding.
A P P E A R

A N C E S:

For the Plaintiff

Steven C. Vanderlinden
Deputy County Attorney
Davis County Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025

For the Defendant

Thomas A. Jones
Attorney at Law
7.111 East 300 South, «219
Salt: Lake City, Utah 34111

Nancy H. Davis
Certified Shorthand Reporter
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1(

1
2

_

MR. JONES:

Judge, we have the Duran matter and

that may be disposed of summarily.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's do it.

State of Utah

4

versus Mark Anthony Duran, 3967.

All right.

5

birth is September 20, 1961; is that correct?

Your date of

6

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

7

THE COURT:

Record can show that the defendant is

8

present, m

the court with counsel.

9

MR. VANDEKLINDEN:

Who is going to speak?

If I could, briefly, your

10

Honor.

11

against Mr. Duran.

12

Count Two is a Second Degree Felony.

13

I have agreed to dismiss Count One, a Third Degree Felony,

14

in return for Mr. Duran pleading guilty to Count Two, a

15

Second Degree Felony.

16
17

This is a negotiated plea.

There are two Counts

Count One is a Third Degree Felony.
On behalf of the Stat

Also, I would not resist the 402 Motion if made b
Mr. Jones.

18

MR. JONES:

That is correct, Judge.

1?

THE COURT:

Mr. Duran, you understand this

20

negotiated plea that has been stated to the Court today?

21

MR. DURAN:

About the 402 Motion?

22

THE COURT:

About the whole thing.

23

MR. DURAN:

Yes.

24

THE COURT:

First, you understand they are savin'

25

we will dismiss Count One if Mr. Duran will plead guilty t

25

1

Count Two.

Do you understand that?

2

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

3

THE COURT:

And you are willing to do that; is

4

that correct?

5

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

6

THE COURT:

And then counsel has said that I may

7

make a motion at the time of sentencing to reduce the Second

8

Degree Felony that you are going to plead guilty to ;» Thir'1

9

Degree Felony.

0

MR. DURAN:

Yes., sir.

1

THE COURT:

He is going to make that motion, but

2

you understand the Court is not obligated to grant the

3

motion.

4

Degree Felony if you enter a plea of guilty today.

5

understand that?

In other words, I could sentence you as a Second
Do you

6

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

7

THE COURT:

Are you agreeable to enter a plea on

8

that kind of basis?

9

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

0

THE COURT:

Counsel, have you explained the

1

charges to him as it would be on the negotiated plea?

2

MR. JONES:

Yes, I have, Judge.

3

THE COURT:

Are you satisfied that he understands

4
5

his constitutional rights?
MR. JONES:

26

Yes, I am, Judge.

THE COURT:

Are you satisfied itfs voluntary,

knowing and understanding the plea that he is going to be
making?
MR. JONES:

Yes, sir, Judge.

THE COURT:

Do you know of any reason why he

should not plead guilty today?

Duran.

HR. JONES:

No, sir, Judge.

THE COURT:

Directing the questions to you, Mr.

Are you currently under the influence of alcohol 01

drugs?
HR. DURAN:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Are you currently being treated for

any physical disability or mental illness?
HR. DURAN:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Have you ever been treated for a

mental disability?
MR. DURAN:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

You understand certain rights that y<

have that you will be waiving by pleading guilty.

Do you

understand?
MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

There won't be a trial either before-

court or before a jury.

Do you understand that?

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

You have a right: normally against

27

1

self-incrimination.

You waive that by pleading guilty.

2

you understand that?

3

MR. DURAM:

Yes, sir.

4

THE COURT:

As a matter of fact, by pleading

Do

5

guilty, that becomes a judicial confession to the offense c

6

theft, a felony of the second degree.

7

that?

Do you understand

8

MR. DURAK:

Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT:

Where the State normally nan .-•:>

10

obligation to prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,

11

they then have no duty at all to prove anything.

12

understand that?

Do you

13

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

14

THE COURT:

A plea of guilty affects your right t

15

appeal, although you still have a right to appeal 30 days

16

after entering sentence if you want to.

17

that?

Do you understand

18

MR. DURAH:

What was that, sir?

19

THE COURT:

A plea of guilty affects your

20

likelihood of your winning on an appeal.

21

that?

Do you understan

22

MR. DURAll:

Yes, sir.

23

THE COURT:

Are you satisfied with the advice yc

24
25

counsel has given you?
MR. DURAN:

28

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you have any questions you want to

ask him before we proceed further?
MR. DURAN:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Have any promises been made to you as

to what the outcome of sentencing would be?

premise.

MR. DURAN:

Only for that 402 Motion.

THE COURT:

Okay.

You understand that's not a

That's just an attempt-MR. DURAN:

Right.

THE COURT:

Has anybody used any force or coercic

or duress in any way to get you to enter into this plea
today?
MR. DURAN:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

You are doing it of your own free wi 1

and choice?
MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Are you pleading guilty because you

are, as a matter of fact, guilty?
MR. DURAN:

Yeah, I'm guilty.

THE COURT:

Any questions you want to ask the

Court before we proceed?
MR. DURAN:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

What war, your involvement in this nr

just the part of Count Two?
MR. DURAN:

29

Just liding out to Bountiful.

That'

1

it.

2

THE COURT:

Oh, what was taken?

3

MR. DURAN:

From the car?

4

THE COURT:

Well, I don't know.

Theft, a felony

5

of the second degree, did obtain or exercise unauthorized

6

control--

7

HR. DURAN

The car?

8

THE COURT

It's a car?

9

MR. DURAN

Right.

10

THE COURT

You were with somebody else, is that

12

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

13

THE COURT:

Both of ycu did it together; is that

3.5

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

16

THE COURT:

Where were you going to go with the

18

MR. DURAN:

Out to Bountiful.

1?

THE COURT:

Where did you take the car, from what

21

MR. DURAN:

Salt Lake.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

it?

\t

17

20

23

correct?

car?

city?

Do you still want to enter a

plea of guilty in the matter?

24

MR. DURAN:

Yes, sir.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

30

As to the charge, Count Two, a

1

felony of the second degree, theft, do you want your plea

2

entered as guilty or not guilty?

3

MR. DURAN:

Guilty.

4

THE COURT:

Court will accept the guilty plea and

5

order the charge in Count One to be dismissed.

Is it

6

agreeable we set sentencing for August 24th at 1:30?

7

MR. JOKES:

Very much so, Judge.

8

MR. DURAN:

Sir, I have cot a sentencing on Augurt

9
10

18 in Salt Lake City.

Would that be of any problem tc

either court?

11

THE COURT:

Ho.

No problem.

12

MR. DURAN:

They can still go with that?

13

THE COURT:

Yes.

No problem.

We will probably

14

have a probation officer that will be checking with you to

15

see what the sentence was, but other than that, there's no

16

problem.

17

Thank you.

We will be in recess for five minutes.

(Whe'reupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
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COUNTY OF DAVIS

I, Nancy H. Davis, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
State cf Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing
transcript, consisting of 8 pages, were stenographically
reported by me at the time and place hereinbefore set forth
that the same was thereafter reduced to typewritten form,
and thc.t the foregoing is a true and correct transcription
of these proceedings requested to be transcribed.
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Nancy H\ Davis
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NANCY H DAVIS
Notr;7 Pub5c
STATE OF UTAH
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IN TOE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARK ANTHONY DURAN,
a.k.a. MARK ANTHONY BRESQKO,
Plaintiff,

RULING

v.
Case No. 940700319 HC
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant.
Recently, the Court has received various communications from plaintiff Mark
Anthony Duran, a.k.a. Mark Anthony Bresqko. The Court has received 2 letters, a pleading
entitled "Motion for Extension of Time to File All Future Motions in this Com! (Motion for
Extension of Time")," and a pleading entitled "Response to Courts Motion to Deny or
Dismiss Petition on Grounds of Frivolous ("Response11)." The Court's clerk has also
received several telephone calls from an individual claiming to be defendant's cousin.
Several months ago the Com! received a letter from defendant claiming to inquire into
the status of his case, and asking if the Court had issued a ailing. In response, the Court sent
defendant a copy of its "Ruling on Petition for Extraordinary Relief," which had been issued
and previously sent to him October 26, 1994. Defendant, in his letter's and in his Response,
infomis the Court that he is known in the Colorado prison where he is now being incarcerated
by the name "Mark Anthony Bresqko," rather than "Mark Anthony Duran." He claims that
the prison's policy is to deliver only correctly addressed mail to inmates, and that this policy
prevented his timely reception of the Court's October 26, 1994 Riling.
The time for appeal now having long since expired, defendant wishes to have the
Court reopen the case and revisit its prior ruling. Apart from there being no procedural basis
33

for a "Response" to a ruling by the Court, defendant has submitted no new evidence that may
in any way justify such action. Nevertheless, the Court understands the procedural problems
faced by his alleged non-reception of the Court's October 26, 1994 ruling. Therefore, the
Court would today reissue the ruling to enable defendant's timely appeal. The ruling, in its
entirety, is thus:
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Petition for Post Conviction Relief to
Vacate Conviction, corresponding Memorandum of Authority, and the other
documents on file with the Court. Having done so, and now being fully
advised, the Court finds pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65(b)(7)
that said petition is frivolous on its face and denies the same. See State v.
Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989) ("By pleading guilty, defendant is
deemed to have admitted all essential elements of the crime charged and
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects."); see also Pasqual v. Carver. 240
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1994) ("Allegations of error cannot be pursued for
the first time by writ of habeas corpus if they could have been raised on direct
appeal."); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994) ("The writ can
neither be a substitute for, nor perform the function of, regular appellate
review").
Furthermore, because the Court rules that this Court's final decision has been made,
the Court would deny defendant's Motion for Extension of Time.

34

Dated July 14, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on the
July f^l ci ^postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark A. Bresqko
Reg. No. 62811
Colorado State Prison
Box 600 CCF
Canon City, CO 81215-600
Anthony Bresqko #62811
CCF.
P.O. Box 600
Canon City, CO 81215-600
Mr. Mark A. Bresqko
Register Number 62811
Unit F-3-1
Box Number 600 CCF
Canon City, CO 81215-600
Mark Anthony Duran
Reg. No. 62811
Box 600 CCF
Canon City, CO 81215-600
<T

y&A^ui6

thAi

/James E. Merrell
vLaw Clerk to the
.~
Honorable Jon M. Mcmmott / t / n A ^
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
Unloaded
firearm.
Aggravated robbery may be committed with
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 P.2d
387 (Utah 1977).
„, , . o
^ • „ , o O O J o,o ,TT. u
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1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246 (Utah
,1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295 (Utah

76-6-401

1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P2d 1375 (Utah
1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989);
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990);
State v. Severance, 828 P2d 1066 (Utah Ct.
APP-1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct.
''
A ~
1Q
App
' iy^*

1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3.
C J . S . — 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 27.
AX.R. — Fact that gun was unloaded as
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th
507.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating
whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
660.
Key N u m b e r s . — Robbery «=» 11.

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401.

Definitions.

For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances t h a t make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
191
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court properly refused to give an instruction
proffered by defendant. State v. Larsen, 876
P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

theft was committed in any manner specified in
§§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 745
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Pleading and practice.
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of
theft" required to be pled by this section to
invoke the provisions of consolidated theft.
Once the prosecution charges a defendant with
the general offense of "theft" under § 76-6-404,
it may then present its evidence to prove the

Receiving stolen property.
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft without the necessity
of establishing thefl by taking. State v. Taylor,
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits thefl if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404.
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-

cial anti-theft laws, § 41-la-1308 et seq.
Shopiiaing Act, § 78-11-14 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Corpus delicti.
In prosecution for larceny it was not essential
that corpus delicti be established by evidence
independent of that adduced to prove that defendant was perpetrator of crime; the same
evidence could be used to prove both. State v.
Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494
(1944).
Corpus delicti for offense of theft consists of
the elements that one entitled to possession of
the property has been deprived of possession
and such deprivation has been accomplished by
a felonious taking; evidence of the property
having been taken from the possession of the
owner without his knowledge or consent is
evidence of both of the elements of the corpus
delicti. State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah
1980).
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Bailments.
Comment on defendant's silence.
Corpus delicti.
Elements of offense.
Evidence.
—Weight and sufficiency.
Included offenses.
—Possession.
Instructions.
Intent.
Pleading and practice.
Possession of recently stolen property.
"Purpose to deprive."
Separate offenses.
Unauthorized control.
Venue.
Cited.
Bailments.
Bailor could be guilty of stealing his own
property, if done with intent to charge bailee.
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626
(1943).
Comment on defendant's silence.
Where defendant charged with theft of building materials from construction site did not
testify in his own defense and offered no evidence to explain his late-night presence at the
site, prosecutor's comment that: 'The defense
has presented no evidence as to why defendant
was out there. What was he doing out there?"
was a legitimate comment on what the total
evidence did or did not show; it was not impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975).

Elements of offense.
State is not required to prove conclusively
who the real owner of the property is, but only
that defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of another. State
v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977).
This section requires a finding of only one of
two disjunctives, "obtained" or "exercised unauthorized control" over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof; conviction for thefl can be upheld without a finding
that defendant "obtained" the property, so long
as there is a finding that he "exercised unauthorized control" over it. State v. Walker, 649
P.2d 16 (Utah 1982).
Evidence.
Proof of identity of stolen goods could be by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. State
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demands by owner, court, sitting without a jury,
was not required to believe defendant's testimony that he gave typewriter to his business
partners to return, since partners were not
called to corroborate his story, and defendant
conveniently forgot important details. State v.
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966).
Evidence supported conviction of embezzlement, where defendant had been given permission to continue to use car on somewhat openended contract after initial rental period had
expired but defendant failed to return car on
specific date on which he was finally told that
he must return it. State v. Heemer, 26 Utah 2d
309, 489 P.2d 107 (1971).
"Gross deviation."

viation" has the common sense meaning of
being an extreme deviation. State v. Owens,
638 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1981).
Use related to purpose of agreement.
Subsection (1) assumes that the property
m a v be used by the custodian for purposes
pr0 perly related to the purpose of the entrustm e n t ; only a use that constitutes "a gross
deviation from the agreed purpose," without
e x p r e s s con sent for personal use, is a crime,
S u t e v Dirker. 6 1 0 R 2 d 1 2 7 5 ( U t a h 1 9 8 0 )
Cited in State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

As used in this section, the term "gross deCOLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 89.
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 46,47.

76-6-411.

Key Numbers. — Larceny «=» 15.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 76-6-411, as enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-411, relating to theft by
failure to make required payment or disposi-

tion of property subject to legal obligation, was
repealed by Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 41.

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conditional plea
Cited

tton on appeal of the purportedly preserved
issue would not have necessarily ended the
prosecution of the case State v Montoya, 858
P2d 1027 (Utah Ct App 1993).

Conditional plea.
Trial court should not have accepted a conditional no contest plea since a favorable resolu-

Cited in State v. Sery, 758 P2d 935 (Utah Ct
App 1988).

ANALYSIS

77-13-4. Felonies — Entry in open court.
All pleas in felony cases shall be entered by the defendant in open court and
the proceedings recorded.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-13-5. Failure to plead — Not guilty entered.
When a defendant does not enter a plea, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty for him.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Waiver.
One accused of crime could waive mere formahty of entering plea of not guilty before

going to trial State v Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176
P 271 (1918)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21A Am Jur 2d Criminal
Law § 447

C.J.S. — 22 C J.S Criminal Law § 378
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <$= 266.

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch.
Iff, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Rule
6SB" for "Rufe 65B(i)* in Subsection (3)
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